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1. INTRODUCTION 
I got the call while on vacation - a long weekend, really - in Florida. 
My colleague was afraid she might have to withdraw from the custody case 
involving the adult, disabled daughter of her client. 
What? Isn't there a hearing in that case next Friday? How can you 
withdraw? And wait a minute - why do you want to? You love this cli-
ent. You've worked so hard for her. Has something happened? 
Well, yes. It turns out the associate had met the client for coffee, as 
planned, and the client had brought the daughter along. The daughter has a 
lawyer. The daughter's lawyer, of course, had not been told about, let 
alone been present at, the meeting. 
What should she do? 
And then there are the sisters - one whom the lawyer has represented 
for more than five years, the other who had been there all along, right be-
side his client. Now they want him to draft wills for them. The hard-
working, diligent, earnest associate did all his homework on client-centered 
lawyering and found himself tied in knots about whom he represented and 
how he could possibly draft wills for both women at the same time. 
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Morton, Kim O'Leary, Ascanio Piomelli, and Denise Roy for their careful reading and cri-
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These are just two examples of those subtle, complicated, knotty, but 
so simple situations that can and do trip up experienced and new lawyers 
alike as they try to figure out how to be effective and ethical advocates for 
and representatives of their clients. Can we be both client-centered and jus-
tice-centered? 1 Can we be both zealous advocates and upholders of truth 
and justice?2 Can we serve as moral advocates without dominating our cli-
ents?3 
In these two snapshots, and in many others like them, the ethical rules 
for lawyers 4 provide little guidance, and their application rarely leads to a 
satisfying result for the client, for the lawyer, or for society. Further, as the 
increasing body of literature that addresses these questions illustrates, there 
is no consensus among scholars or practitioners on how a lawyer can, let 
alone should, act in trying to balance these competing obligations. Adding 
complexity to - or maybe in fact simplifying - this debate are the nu-
anced, complex, multifaceted experiences our clients share with us. 
In this piece, I introduce the stories that describe those experiences. 
More precisely, I suggest a process for incorporating these stories into the 
analysis a lawyer undertakes to determine his obligations as an advocate for 
his client. Though both stories involve "ethical" issues arguably governed 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct, my analysis is not limited to or even 
necessarily focused on the system of ethical regulation. Instead, I use the 
Rules of Professional Conduct as a lens through which to examine aspects 
of the lawyer-client relationship. Drawing from the experiences of these 
1. See Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers' Ethical Deliberation, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (2006) (describing different theories of ethical regulation). 
2. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' 
ETHICS 160-61 (3d ed. 2004); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 12 
(1988); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LA WYERS' ETHICS 2 
(1998) [hereinafter SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE]; Carle, supra note 1; Nathan M. Crys-
tal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME lL. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 75 
(2000); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Pov-
erty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 
1105-06 (1994); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
469,506-07 (1984); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 443, 517 (1999); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Re-
sponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,7-8 (1999) [hereinafter Wendel, Public Values]; W. 
Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113 (2000). 
3. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1994); Stephen EHmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 
(1992); Stephen EHmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Stephen EH-
mann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 895 (2000); David Luban, Paternal-
ism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REv. 454 (1981); Richard Wasserstrom, Law-
yers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). 
4. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules of 
Professional Conduct" or "Rules") have been adopted in whole or in part by every state ex-
cept California to serve as the system of ethical regulation of lawyers. ABA, ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct - Center for Professional Responsibility, http:// 
www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/modeLrules.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). I will be applying 
the Rules of Professional Conduct throughout this Article. 
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two sets of clients and their lawyers,S I propose an approach to client repre-
sentation that requires the lawyer to engage in a deeply contextual analysis 
of the specific and particular situation presented to him in any particular 
case, and work with his client to determine how to resolve whatever issues 
arise. 
Part II of this Article introduces the stories of these clients as the law-
yers came to know them and as the ethical dilemmas unfolded. 6 This sec-
tion sets the stage for further analysis both of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and of the process lawyers undertake to understand and apply 
those Rules. Part III shifts the focus to the Rules themselves and tells the 
stories again, this time in the context of those Rules. This second telling 
reveals that the rules that make up the system of ethical regulation are in-
terpreted to apply to generic, abstract clients in generic, abstract situations. 7 
As the retold stories illustrate, these generic, abstract interpretations do not 
work very well when applied to specific, unique situations. 
Drawing on critical lawyering and narrative theory, Part IV proposes 
an alternative approach to resolving ethical conflicts. I suggest that the sys-
tem of ethical regulation should be interpreted to allow room for the attor-
ney to consider and incorporate the client's narrative context. With this 
proposal, I join the likes of theorists David Wilkins,8 David Luban, 9 Robert 
Gordon,lo William Simon, II Deborah Rhode,12 Russell Pearce,13 Thomas 
5. While these stories all involve clinic students representing clients, my focus is on 
the students as lawyers, not as students. These same situations could easily arise in the prac-
tice of new or even experienced lawyers. I therefore refer to them throughout this Article 
simply as "the attorney" or "the lawyer," rather than as "the student." 
6. Binny Miller has suggested that there is a difference between the terms "narrative" 
and "story" - that "story" involves the "raw material" of life, while "narrative" is the con-
struction of meaning from that raw material. Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and 
Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS I, 1 (2000). See also Jane B. 
Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 145 (1997). While I be-
lieve the distinction has interesting theoretical value, I do not use it in this paper, choosing 
instead to describe the stories and the process of constructing them explicitly. 
7. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1731,1738 (1993). 
8. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 
799 (1992). 
9. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders D(flerent?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 
(1993). 
10. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New Rolefor Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor 
After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003). 
II. See, e.g., SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9; William H. Simon, 
Ethical Discretion in La-wyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, 
Ethical Discretion]. 
12. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 66-67 (2000). 
13. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins oj'the Legal 
Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992) . 
1= m; 
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Shaffer,14 Bradley Wendel,15 and Susan Carle 16 in suggesting that context 
should playa significant role in any system of ethical regulation. 17 
The context that I am talking about, however, is the client's particular 
story. Such an approach places the client in the center of the inquiry and 
requires the lawyer and client to engage actively in dialogue and problem-
solving. It allows the lawyer and client to arrive at solutions together that 
both respond to the particular client's needs and attend to the moral and 
ethical concerns the lawyer and society might have. By using a critically 
reflective, intentional process of inquiry around ethical concerns, the law-
yer must focus on this particular client in the context of the client's life and 
the client's legal and non-legal needs in this particular situation. By widen-
ing the frame in this way and focusing on the client's whole story - not 
just his legal case - the lawyer is much better able not only to resolve 
whatever ethical or other conflicts may arise, but maybe even to avoid them 
altogether. 
14. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 3. 
15. See, e.g., Wendel, Public Values, supra note 2. 
16. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 1. 
17. In addition to the theorists discussed briefly here, Peter Margulies proposes that, at 
least when considering conflict of interest rules, the goals and missions of potentially con-
flicting clients act as the context against which to determine whether a conflict exists. Peter 
Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of Interest and 
the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2359-63 (1999). See 
also John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lmiyering 
at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1927, 1932 (1999); 
Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the La11yer's Duty to Workfor 
the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REv. 901 (1995). 
Other scholars have suggested applying a contextual analysis based on various factors 
to other lawyer-client interactions. Kimberly O'Leary has suggested using a contextual 
method for choosing among different client counseling models by examining "three sets of 
variables": law practice settings; "specific values, desires, talents, cultural backgrounds, ex-
periences, and attributes" of both attorney and client; and the lawyers' abilities "related to 
levels of experience, age, and professional growth." Kimberly E. O'Leary, When Context 
Matters: How to Choose an Appropriate Client Counseling Model, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. 
& CLINICAL L. 103, 104 (2001). See also ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-
AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE ApPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1999); 
Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REv. 697 (1992); Stephen 
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization 
in Public Interest La11Yers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); Ell-
mann, Empathy and Approval, supra note 3; Michelle S. Jacobs, People From the Foot-
notes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
345 (1997); Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of Prac-
tice, 31 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 121 (1999); Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the 
Relationship Between La11yer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 
TENN. L. REV. 1019 (1997). 
w 
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II. THE LAWYERS' CONTEXT 
A. (UN)REPRESENTED PARTIES: SAYRA AND LAURA'S STORY 
The lawyer wanted to "put a face to the name." For months now, her l8 
client, Sayra,19 had been talking about Laura, her nineteen-year-old daugh-
ter: what she had been like as a baby and as a child, how much she loved 
animals, how she managed her mental disabilities (autism and developmen-
tal delay), how beautiful she was as a baby and is now, her struggles hold-
ing down jobs and getting through school, how well they had always gotten 
along, how much she missed Laura since she had moved in with her father, 
what they did together on visits. Laura was Sayra's favorite topic of con-
versation. It was natural curiosity and interest that led the lawyer to want 
to meet Laura. 
Sayra had come to the lawyer six months earlier, referred by the law-
yer's acupuncturist. She was looking for help modifying a custody order. 
Sayra and her ex-husband, Ishmael, had divorced two years before (though 
they were separated for six years before that), and the judge had granted 
full custody of Laura to Ishmael. Sayra had learned that Ishmael was plan-
ning to get married, and she came to the law office seeking to have Laura 
come back to live with her. 
Even after six months as the lawyer's client, Sayra was reticent to the 
point of being shut down - except when talking about her daughter. The 
lawyer wanted to be responsive to her client, to try to bridge the gap of 
trust and confidence she still felt between them, so when Sayra shyly asked 
if she would like to meet Laura and her for coffee sometime, the lawyer 
could not see the harm. She knew, of course, that Laura was the subject of 
the custody dispute between Sayra and her ex-husband, and she also knew 
that Laura herself had an attorney. 
So the three had coffee together. It was a pleasant half-hour. They 
talked about Laura's job, what she liked to do for fun, her dogs, her guinea 
pig. They also talked about whether she liked where she was living (with 
her father) and where she would like to live (with her mother). Laura never 
made eye contact with or spoke directly to the lawyer, but answered her 
questions through Sayra. As they talked, the lawyer could feel Sayra' s 
18. A word about gender and consistency: The lawyer in this story is a woman. In the 
next it's a man. But throughout the piece, when I talk about hypothetical lawyers or clients, 
not those described in these stories, the lawyers are sometimes male and sometimes female, 
as are the clients. I do this so as not to essentialize or build on stereotypes one way or the 
other. 
19. The clients described in these snapshots are based on real cases that arose in the 
clinic I taught. Names and other identifYing characteristics have been changed to protect 
confidentiality. There is some debate in the literature about the ethical propriety of using 
clients' stories in this way. See, e.g., Ann Juergens, Teach Your Students Well: Valuing Cli-
ents in the Law School Clinic, 2 CORNELL lL. & PUB. POL'y 339, 372-74 (1993); Miller, 
supra note 6. 
!litllitJ. 
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pleasure at the connection among the three of them. Once Laura had left to 
go to work, Sayra was more open and expansive with the lawyer than she 
had ever been. They spent close to an hour talking about the divorce and 
the current custody situation in a way they never had before. 
The lawyer left the coffee house feeling connected to her client and op-
timistic about their prospects in the custody hearing later that week. She 
also felt better able to represent Sayra effectively, and not only for legal 
reasons. Sure, she had met Laura and had seen her and Sayra interact. As 
such, she could form the judgment that Sayra was a fit mother and that it 
was in Laura's best interest to be with her. But she also felt that, having 
seen Laura and Sayra interact, she understood her client better, could see 
her more fully, and could tell the story of Sayra's relationship with Laura 
with greater investment and authority. 
When Sayra' s lawyer returned to her office and wrote up notes of the 
meeting, she remembered that rule about not talking with someone who is 
represented by counsel without that counsel's presence or consent. 20 Here, 
she had done just that! Knowing full well that Laura had a lawyer, she had 
gone ahead and met with the young woman without the other lawyer's 
knowledge, let alone consent. Not only that, but they had actually talked 
about the substance of the case. In her excitement about the opportunity to 
connect more fully and meaningfully with her client, the lawyer had com-
pletely forgotten about Rule 4.2 and had inadvertently violated it. Sayra's 
lawyer had connected with Laura not as another represented party, but as 
her client's daughter, a character in her client's story. She had discussed 
where Laura liked to live best not because it was the subject of the custody 
dispute but because it was part of the story Laura was telling. 
After meeting with her senior partner, the lawyer called both the fa-
ther's lawyer and Laura's lawyer and told them what had happened, includ-
ing the full extent of the discussion about where Laura wanted to live. She 
apologized profusely, blaming the mistake on inexperience and on getting 
swept up in the human drama of the situation. 
The father's lawyer did not have much of a reaction to the lawyer's 
confession, but Laura's lawyer was furious. She could not accept that the 
mistake had been made in good faith. She believed that Sayra had arranged 
the meeting and directed the conversation purposely to get Laura to say that 
she liked living with her mother better. To her, the situation was further 
evidence of Sayra's irresponsibility as a mother. 
20. Rule 4.2 states: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
5 &" .", 
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After some agonizing consultation with her colleagues and her client, 
the lawyer felt she had no choice but to offer to withdraw from the case, in 
part because she did not want to give Laura's lawyer the opportunity to use 
the mistake as evidence of Sayra' s unfitness. The lawyer made her offer to 
withdraw on the morning of the scheduled custody hearing, along with a 
motion to continue the matter to give Sayra time either to find a new law-
yer or to prepare to represent herself. The judge accepted the lawyer's of-
fer to withdraw and granted the motion to continue the case for one month. 
Despite her best efforts over the next weeks, the lawyer was unable to 
find anyone willing or able to take Sayra's case, and Sayra herself seemed 
very reluctant to pursue finding a lawyer on her own. She had not really 
understood why the lawyer had had to withdraw - all she did was meet 
her daughter, after all. Why was that such a big deal? But she had not put 
up a fight, and when last they spoke, Sayra seemed resigned and was pre-
paring to represent herself at the hearing. 
B. 'CONFLICTS' OF INTEREST: LILLIAN AND ELLIE'S STORY 
Lillian had been a pro bono client of the lawyer forever, or so it 
seemed. She had fought child protective services so she did not lose her 
kids. He had figured out how to get the city to pay for rewiring the electri-
cal system in her house to bring it up to code. He had got her higher un-
employment benefits. Currently, he was negotiating with various creditors 
to consolidate and reduce her consumer debt. When something confused or 
frustrated Lillian, she called the lawyer, explained what it was she needed, 
and he looked into it. 
Each September, the lawyer would meet with Lillian in the house she 
shared with her sister, Ellie. He would sit in the cozy, cluttered living room 
in a well-worn chair, facing Lillian and Ellie on the couch. Lillian had be-
come increasingly infirm over the years, so she rarely got up off the couch 
but instead directed her sister to get the attorney this or that piece of paper, 
to refill soda glasses, to answer the phone, to bring in the latest pictures of 
Ellie's grandchildren. Ellie was a constant presence, hovering, ministering, 
filling in gaps of information. 21 Lillian always knew exactly what she 
wanted from the lawyer; Ellie was there to help however she could so that 
what Lillian wanted got communicated. 
Lillian loved the lawyer's passion and energy, he flourished under her 
praise and blessings, and learned enormous amounts about representing 
empowered clients who nonetheless needed help navigating particular sys-
tems. So when Lillian said she wanted the lawyer to draft wills for her and 
for Ellie, at first no one thought twice. 
21. Ellie's presence, of course, raises questions about what kind of attorney-client 
privilege existed between the lawyer and Lillian. That, however, is for another time. 
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Then the lawyer became troubled: Who was his client? Lillian, right? 
So could he represent Ellie, too? The conflict of interest rule states that "a 
lawyer shall not represent a client if ... the representation of one client will 
be directly adverse to another client.,,22 Further, "a lawyer shall not repre-
sent a client" if "there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of 
the lawyer.,,23 
The lawyer pondered the rule. If he agreed to write a will for Ellie, his 
representation of Lillian could be adversely affected. The lawyer currently 
represented Lillian with respect to financial matters. If Ellie were to decide 
not to leave any money or property to Lillian, this could jeopardize Lillian 
financially in the future. This would create an actual conflict between what 
Lillian wanted him to do and what Ellie wanted him to do. 
In addition, because the lawyer had a longstanding relationship with 
Lillian based on the many issues on which he had represented her, the at-
torney-client relationship had taken on a personal nature. Because of the 
lawyer's sense of loyalty and responsibility to Lillian, his professional 
judgment on behalf of Ellie might be adversely affected. 
Not to mention the confidentiality problem: Under Rule 1.6, a lawyer 
shall not "reveal information relating to the representation of a client" ex-
cept under narrowly defined circumstances. 24 This means that if the lawyer 
were to write a will for Ellie, the lawyer could not reveal any of the infor-
mation Ellie discussed with the lawyer to Lillian. Lillian could not be pre-
sent when the lawyer interviewed Ellie about what she wanted the will to 
say, and the lawyer could not tell Lillian what Ellie wanted the will to say 
if Lillian were to ask. Which brought the lawyer back to the conflict of in-
terest problem: If Ellie decided that she did not want to leave Lillian any 
money or property, this might jeopardize Lillian financially. Since the 
lawyer had an obligation to Lillian to look out for her financial situation, 
the lawyer would not be zealously advocating on her behalf if he know-
ingly withheld harmful information from her. 
Neither the rule on confidentiality nor the rule on conflicts of interest, 
however, seemed an outright bar to representation under these circum-
stances. In fact, Rule 1.7 allows a lawyer to represent a client in a case like 
this if the attorney fully discloses to both clients "the implications of the 
common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidential-
ity and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved," 
and obtains informed, written consent from both of them. 25 Rule 1.6 fur-
ther provides that a lawyer "may reveal information relating to the repre-
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(l) (2002). 
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.I. 7(a)(2) (2002). 
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003). 
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.I. 7(b)( 4) & cmt. (2002). 
faifT 
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sentation of a client [if] the client gives informed consent" about the pro-
posed use of the information. 26 
So according to the Rules, the lawyer could draft a will for Ellie if he 
fulfilled the following conditions: He would have to meet with each sister 
individually, explain the potential conflict to her, and ask her to provide in-
formed consent to proceed with the representation despite the conflict and 
to waive her right to confidentiality as to the other. He imagined that the 
conversations might go something like this: 
Lillian, if I represent Ellie in drafting her will, and she decides not 
to leave any money to you, that would hurt your financial situation, 
and I would feel tom about helping her do that because of my loy-
alty to you. Plus, unless she tells me I can, I would not be able to 
tell you that she was not planning to leave you any money. Are 
you okay with that? If not, I will not represent Ellie. 
Then, in the next room: 
Ellie, if I help you draft your will, and you decide you do not want 
to leave any money to Lillian, that would hurt her financial situa-
tion, and I would feel tom about helping you do that because of my 
loyalty to her. And I might have to withdraw as your lawyer. Plus, 
I would like to be able to tell her what you plan to do with your 
money, but I cannot because if you're my client, whatever you tell 
me stays between us, unless you tell me I can tell Lillian. Would 
you be willing to let me tell Lillian what you want to do with your 
money? If so, and if you're okay with my having to withdraw if 
you do anything that might hurt Lillian, I would be happy to help 
you draft your will. 
Armed with his research and copies of waivers and consents for every-
one to sign, the lawyer went out to Lillian's house to start the process. He 
sat in the cluttered and cozy living room, just as he had done so many times 
before, across the room from Lillian and Ellie, who sat on the couch side 
by side, as they always did. Lillian and Ellie looked expectantly at the 
lawyer. "So," Lillian began, chuckling, "can we get this thing started? I 
know you people charge us by the hour." 
The lawyer looked back at her and cleared his throat. 
"Well," he said, "I actually need to talk to each of you alone a bit to see 
if you both really want me to write your wills." The sisters looked back at 
him like he had just suggested they strip off all their outer garments. 
"Well of course we want you to write our wills," snorted Ellie indig-
nantly. "That's why we asked you to come out here today." 
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003). 
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"That's right," added Lillian. "What do you mean you need to talk to 
each of us separately? We're family. What you need to say to me, you can 
say to me in front of Ellie and same for her. That's how we do things 
around here. You know that." 
The lawyer knew Lillian was right. He had never been alone with ei-
ther woman for more than the two or three minutes it sometimes took for 
Ellie to fetch their drinks or documents or pictures. Once, in fact, he had 
arrived at the appointed time for their meeting only to be sent away because 
Ellie had been unexpectedly delayed and was not at the house. Lillian was 
not willing to have the meeting without Ellie there. He looked down at his 
papers, at a loss for how to proceed. 
III. THE RULES' CONTEXT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One place to start analyzing these ethical dilemmas and the light they 
might shed on the lawyer-client relationship is the relevant system of ethi-
cal rules and the stories underlying those rules. As a growing body of legal 
scholarship recognizes, not all stories are equal in the eyes of the law. 27 
Rather, some stories are believed and valued by legal decisionmakers and 
thus become a part of the network of stories embodied in the dominant le-
gal discourse - what I call "official stories.,,28 Others are not believed or 
valued by the legal decisionmakers and thus remain outside that discourse. 
Scholars and critics have identified these as "outsider narratives" and have 
suggested that the "official stories" are official only because they are con-
structed as such; they are told by and about people familiar and similar to 
the "insiders" who hear the stories. Thus, those stories are easily incorpo-
rated into the dominant legal discourse. 29 Stories told by or about those un-
27. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 
(1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons ofCli-
ent Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 65 (1991); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 
2475 (1993); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 
46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 607 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Es-
say on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); Christopher Gilkerson, Poverty Law 
Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 
43 HASTINGS LJ. 861 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and 
Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal 
Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kell.von the Para-
dox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990); Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip 
to Benetton and Beyond, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109 (1997) [hereinafter Grose, Benetton and 
Beyond]. 
28. Grose, Benetton and Beyond, supra note 27. 
29. I use the terms "outsider narrative" and "outsider jurisprudence" generally to de-
scribe a movement in legal literature and academia to incorporate the voices of "outsiders" 
into mainstream legal dialogue. See, e.g., Professor Mari 1. Matsuda, University of Hawaii, 
When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, Keynote 
tM" illlill ; ubL .. tim' .. 
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familiar to the insiders hearing the stories do not fit easily into the insiders' 
worldview and thus do not become official stories. The system of official 
stories thereby reinforces both the dominant discourse and the silence of 
those outside that discourse. 3o 
This silencing is particularly invidious because it acts not only to si-
lence a particular outsider but also to maintain the system of official stories 
that causes the silencing in the first place. The power and irony of this sys-
tem is that as long as the official stories are the only ones that can be heard, 
believed, and thus retold, even the stories about those outside the system 
are accessible only through texts written by insiders about the lives of out-
siders. 3 I The system of texts that make up the dominant legal discourse 
operates as one of what Foucault calls "regimes of truth. ,,32 These regimes 
of truth serve to "legitimize what can be said, who has the authority to 
speak, and what is sanctioned as true. ,,33 Another way to describe hegem-
ony, then, is that the insiders, the dominant group, have so effectively 
communicated their versions of reality to the rest of society that those sto-
ries have become embedded in what can be called "common sense" or "the 
natural order," or even "right and wrong.,,34 
B. STORIES EMBEDDED IN THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The current system of ethical regulation operates as one of these re-
gimes of truth. The Rules and their accompanying commentary deal not 
with the realities of outsider clients' lives, but with the clients as "card-
Address at the Yale Law School Conference on Women of Color and the Law (Apr. 16, 
1988), in 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989). By "outsider," I mean someone who does not 
have access to the channels of power and communication in this society; conversely, an "in-
sider" is someone who does have that access. The "outsider jurisprudence" or "outsider nar-
rative" movement embraces many different theories and theorists, which are beyond the 
scope of this Article. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, A Primer on Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of 
Word-Plays," 71 N.C. L. REV. 201, 230-31 (1992). See also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 1-12 (1992); Richard Delgado, Story-
tellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); 
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse ofFingerpointing as the 
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1987) (all three Critical Race 
theorists using "outsider narrative" to expose how the law and society reinforce prejudice 
and discrimination). 
30. See Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients' Stories, 12 
CLINICAL L. REv. 329, 331 (2006) [hereinafter Grose, Constructing Clients' Stories]. 
31. Post-colonial theorist Gayatri Spivak describes these as texts "from the other side." 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Talk: Interview with the Editors, in THE SPIVAK 
READER: SELECTED WORKS OF GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK 307 (Donna Landry & Ge-
rald MacLean eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE SPIVAK READER]. 
32. TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 11 (Mauri anne Adams, Lee Anne 
Bell & Pat Griffin eds., 1997) (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 3 
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1980». 
33. Id. 
34. Grose, Benetton and Beyond, supra note 27, at 110; Grose, Constructing Clients' 
Stories, supra note 30, at 329. 
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board figures" in general. 35 They rely on stories about people who want to 
maximize their wealth and freedom and are willing to use whatever means 
necessary to achieve those goals. 36 Weare certainly familiar with the sto-
ries from our Professional Responsibility casebooks about the clients who 
seek help from their lawyers to keep bodies hidden,37 to forge financial 
documents,38 or to perjure themselves. 39 As teachers, we have our students 
read these cases, and as lawyers we read them ourselves, to make sense of 
the set of rules we have to follow - rules that appear to have been written 
to give lawyers tools to constrain these immoral clients seeking to use the 
legal system to carry out their nefarious schemes. 40 While the body dis-
posers, forgers, and perjurers are perhaps extreme versions of the "official 
stories" underlying the ethical rules, they are not so far off. Let us take a 
look at the particular rules implicated by the stories we are considering 
here. 
1. The (Un)represented Party Story 
First, there is the "narrative of the represented party," as codified in 
Rule 4.2. Rule 4.2 states: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a 
court order. 41 
Commentary to Rule 4.2 states that its purpose is to protect a repre-
sented party from "overreaching," "interference," and "uncounselled dis-
closure of information. ,,42 
35. Shalleck, supra note 7, at 1737. 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 51, 57 (3d ed. 1999); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 487-88 (5th ed. 1998); ANDREW KAUFMAN & 
DAVID WILKINS, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 
202-03 (4th ed. 2002); LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 124-26 (2005); THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 408-09 (7th ed. 2000). 
38. See, e.g., LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 37, at 151. 
39. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (holding that counsel is obli-
gated to violate a client's confidence where the client discloses an intent to perjure himself). 
See also HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 37, at 356; GILLERS, supra note 37, at 
384; KAUFMAN & WILKINS, supra note 37, at ] 69-70; LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 37, at 
489,495; MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 37, at 419,421. 
40. See, e.g., TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, 
AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 39 (1987); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Prom-
ulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981); Wilkins, supra note 8 (each providing an 
interesting analysis of different theories underlying professional ethical regulation). 
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (2002). 
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So the main characters in our Rule 4.2 story are the client (Sayra) and 
her lawyer; and the other client (Laura, Sayra's daughter) and her lawyer. 
Ishmael, Sayra's ex-husband, plays a minor role, but appears as a character 
as well, as does his lawyer. The Rule seems to imagine the following 
story:43 
Once upon a time, there was a client named Laura who had a lawyer in 
a custody case. 44 All was fine until Laura's mother, Sayra, colluded with 
her own lawyer to take advantage of Laura. They sneaked up on her in a 
coffee shop without telling her lawyer and got her to admit all kinds of 
things about where she wanted to live and what made her happy. Luckily, 
Rule 4.2 provides redress for this situation by forcing Sayra's lawyer to 
confess what she has done to all the other characters. They get to decide 
what happens to her, and Laura and her lawyer can live happily ever after. 
In order for this story to make sense, a number of assumptions about 
the characters must be taken as true. First, that Sayra is a wealth and free-
dom maximizer - in this case, she wanted to maximize her freedom to 
manipulate Laura and Ishmael and the legal system in order to achieve her 
nefarious goal of gaining custody of Laura. Second, that Sayra's lawyer is 
also unscrupulous and devious and believes that the way to achieve the cli-
ent's goal of gaining custody of Laura is to sneak up on Laura. Third, that 
Laura herself is so easily manipulable and vulnerable and in need of protec-
tion that without her lawyer's presence, her manipulation and exploitation 
is a foregone conclusion. Finally, that Laura's lawyer is in fact a source of 
protection against that manipulation. 
The Rule also relies on assumptions about the clients' goals and how to 
achieve them. Sayra' s goal appears to be to regain custody of Laura at all 
costs. The story suggests that both Sayra and her lawyer believe that the 
43. There is always more than one story, even an official one. I offer the following as 
one of the myriad of "official" stories that underlie Rule 4.2. I choose it because in many 
ways it is the simplest one to deconstruct as inapplicable to the facts of this particular client 
situation. See infra Part V (describing the potential usefulness of the Rules even with their 
official stories). 
44. I am using the language and structure of narrative theory in constructing this story. 
See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME SEYMOUR BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113 
(2000); Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of Dis-
pute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 833 (2004). For descriptions and analyses of the role 
of narrative theory in legal scholarship, see generally LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Alfieri, supra note 27; 
Gary Bellow & Martha Minow, Introduction: Rita's Case and Other Law Stories, in LAW 
STORIES 1-29 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme 
Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Clark D. 
Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about the Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 2459 (1989); Farber & Sherry, supra note 27; Grose, Benetton and Beyond, supra note 
27; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485,563-67 (1994) [here-
inafter Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives]; Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 297-307 (2002) [hereinafter Miller, Teaching Case Theory]. 
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easiest way - if not the only way - for Sayra to achieve her goal is 
through this manipulation of Laura, that there is no non-nefarious means of 
achieving her goal, and that no story that would make sense without ma-
nipulating Laura. It assumes all three clients are in conflict with one an-
other and that their goals are therefore irreconcilable, Ishmael's goal is also 
to gain custody of Laura at all costs, and Laura's goal is to have the issue 
resolved without consideration of the goals of either of her parents. It also 
assumes that, left to their own devices, these clients could not possibly 
work out a solution that met everyone's needs, so the lawyers must be pre-
sent at all times to save the clients from themselves. Finally, it assumes 
that lawyers can actually act as moral, unifying, and compromising influ-
ences. Notice how this assumption tends to contradict the other assumption 
about the nefarious motives of Sayra' s lawyer. Which is it? Is the lawyer a 
manipulator, a protector, or a mediator? 
Rule 4.2 also relies on a theme that recurs throughout the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct: the lawyer-client dyad. We will see this more clearly in 
the stories underlying the conflict and confidentiality rules, but even here, 
we see a codification of the insularity of the lawyer-client relationship. 
Laura and her lawyer would live happily ever after if only Sayra's lawyer 
were banished from the kingdom. 
2. The 'Conflicts' of Interest Story 
Now let us tum to the "narrative of the conflicting interests." The basic 
conflict of interest rule, Rule 1.7, states, "A lawyer shall not represent a cli-
ent with respect to a matter [if] representation of another client will be or is 
likely to be adversely affected by such representation.,,45 In addition, Rule 
1.6 states, in part, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent.,,46 The 
comments to both Rules highlight loyalty and independence as "the essen-
tial elements in the lawyer's relationship.,,47 
So who are the characters in the stories embedded in these Rules? 
There is Lillian, the longtime client, and her lawyer. There is also the new 
client, Ellie, who wants the lawyer to represent her. The rules against dual 
representation imagine a story in which Ellie and Lillian either do or could 
have secrets and private lives that exist in inherent conflict with each other. 
For example, Ellie might secretly want to give most of her money to one of 
her children, not to Lillian. Or Lillian might secretly be plotting to kill off 
Ellie so she can get her hands on Ellie's money - that is why she wants 
the lawyer to draft their wills. The lawyer must be very careful both to pro-
tect the clients from each other and to protect himself from the clients by 
having them sign waivers of conflict and confidentiality. 
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.I. 7(b )(3) (2002). 
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003). 
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3) & R. 1.6 cmt. (2003). 
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This story, too, rests on a number of assumptions about the client, the 
lawyer, and the narrative itself. First is the notion that a client is by defini-
tion an individual, and protection of that individual's autonomy is the law-
yer's paramount duty.48 Ellie and Lillian, according to Rule 1.7, must be 
independent and distinct, moral and social actors whose interests, needs, 
and goals risk being in conflict - being as they are the interests, needs, 
and goals of independent and distinct entities. 
Second is the idea that the lawyer cannot possibly hold all of these in-
terests, needs, and goals at once without violating either or both clients' 
rights as autonomous individuals. Here, we see again the theme of the 
lawyer-client dyad. The story embedded in these ethical rules seeks to cod-
ify loyalty on the part of the lawyer by defining his representation of an-
other client with overlapping interests as a betrayal of his relationship with 
his current client. The rules against concurrent representation describe a 
monogamous, spousal relationship between the lawyer and the client. Any 
attempt by the lawyer to go outside that relationship is prohibited absent 
the consent of both the current client (the spouse) and the new client (the 
lover). 
Finally, as with the story underlying Rule 4.2, the story underlying 
Rules l.6 and 1.7 rests on the assumption that the three characters - Ellie, 
Lillian, and the lawyer - cannot work it out on their own. Instead, they 
need the very formal and formulaic safeguards required by the Rules to 
protect the two clients from each other and to protect the lawyer from the 
two clients. 49 
3. The Official Stories 
Because they are written in the language of individual rights and 
autonomy, and conflict and adversity, all of these rules ignore the possibil-
48. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-
Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369,401-14 (2006) (describing the challenge 
between balancing client autonomy with lawyer paternalism). See also Robert D. Diner-
stein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 512-
13 (1990); Ellmann, Lal1'Yers and Clients, supra note 3, at 759-60; Luban, supra note 3; 
Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argumentfor 
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315,316-17 (1987). 
49. Much has been written on the effect that overly restrictive conflict rules have on 
clients' access to justice. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 17, at 2342. There are other cri-
tiques of conflict rules, as well. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of In-
terest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457 (1993); John Leubsdorf, Using Legal Ethics to Screw Your 
Enemies and Clients, 11 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 831 (1998); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of 
Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-
Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 497, 499 (1998); Douglas R. Richmond, Choosing Sides: Is-
sue or Positional Conflicts of Interest, 51 FLA. L. REv. 383, 384-86 (1999); Norman W. 
Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Pub-
lico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interests, 108 
YALE L.1. 407,437-38 (1998). 
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ity of connections among multiple "parties," the complexity of familial and 
domestic arrangenlents, and the nuances of communication and problem-
solving across interests and values. This particular regime of truth - the 
system of ethical regulation - operates by failing to recognize, let alone 
appreciate, the different sets of values, priorities, customs, and relationship 
structures of "outsider" clients. 50 The Rules render invisible very signifi-
cant "other" people, designating them as "third parties" and therefore le-
gally irrelevant, or at least less privileged in the current legal forum. 51 
In short, the Rules of Professional Conduct operate on stories that do 
not belong or bear any relation to Sayra and Laura or to Ellie and Lillian. 
Instead, the Rules resolve troubles that might not exist for these clients, or 
they address characters that might not populate the clients' lives. As such, 
the application of these rules might very well leave these clients worse off 
than they were when they walked into their lawyers' offices. 52 
IV. THE CLIENTS' CONTEXT 
A. A CALL TO CONTEXT 53 
An alternative approach to these ethical dilemmas, and to the idea of 
client representation overall, would allow for the complexity of client con-
texts by giving the lawyer discretion to inquire into and incorporate the 
multiplicity of client's stories. This approach would not only make room 
for outsider voices; it would also be a more effective and moral system. If 
lawyers, under the system of ethical regulation, are able to make judgments 
based on the full frame of their clients' lives (For example, is this really a 
conflict between these two women? Are the concerns of Rule 4.2 necessar-
ily implicated by this particular family structure?), those judgments are 
50. For feminist theoretical analyses of moral and ethical dilemmas, see, e.g., CAROL 
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 
173-74 (1982); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and 
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1697-99 (1991); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, De-
mocracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 
MD. L. REv. 150, 155 (1999); and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at 
Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 274 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005). See also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
51. Kimberly 0 'Leary critiques the ethical rules for their failure to consider the inter-
ests, needs, and goals of what are legally considered "third parties" (and therefore legally 
irrelevant at best). Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach Problem-
Solving, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 70-72 (1997). 
52. Kruse warns that "a lawyer's failure to confront the interrelationship of a client's 
legal issues with the non-legal aspects of a client's problem will at best only partially ad-
dress the client's problem; and at worse may leave the client worse off than before the legal 
representation began." Kruse, supra note 48, at 377. 
53. See Calmore, supra note 17, at 1927-28; Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Story-
telling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2106 
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more likely to be "good" judgments for the lawyer, for the client, for the 
judicial system, and for society - such judgments respond to the problems 
of real people in real life situations. As Phyllis Goldfarb describes, "ethics 
becomes a sustained practice of empirical attention and reflection on the 
actions of people in actual situations. . .. The better our context-sensitive 
empiricism, the better our moral deliberations, and the more precise the ar-
ticulation of our ethical principles will be.,,54 
I suggest, therefore, that the system of ethical regulation should be in-
terpreted to allow room for the attorney to consider and incorporate the cli-
ent's narrative context. My proposal joins those of other ethical scholars 
who suggest context should playa significant role in any system of ethical 
regulation. 55 David Wilkins has argued forcefully that "[ c ]ontext must re-
place universality as the touchstone of system design. ,,56 He describes his 
notion of context as including an examination of "task (for example, litiga-
tion versus counseling), subject matter (for example, civil versus criminal), 
and status (for example, plaintiff versus defendant)[,] lawyer (for example, 
sole practitioner versus large firm) and client (for example, individual ver-
sus corporate ).,,57 He looks, in other words, to the "social and institutional 
context" of the case. 58 David Luban and Robert Gordon have joined Wil-
kins in suggesting that ethical regulation should vary according to the prac-
tice area in which the issue arises. 59 
Luban joins other "justice-centered,,60 theorists who look to the context 
of the judicial system as a whole. These scholars, including William 
Simon,61 Deborah Rhode,62 Russell Pearce,63 Thomas Shaffer,64 Bradley 
Wendel,65 and others,66 are concerned with the harm lawyers can cause to 
the legal system, and more specifically to "the fragile fabric of public regu-
latory law.,,67 They propose that the lawyer's ethical obligations be "ana-
54. Goldfarb, supra note 50, at 1698. 
55. See supra note 17. 
56. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 515 (1990). 
57. !d. at 517. 
58. Id. at 516. See also Wilkins, supra note 8, at 814-19 (arguing that regulatory 
measures should vary with practice context). 
59. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 10; Luban, supra note 9. 
60. Carle, supra note 1, at 116. 
61. See, e.g., SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9. See also Simon, 
Ethical Discretion, supra note 11, at 1090 ("[T]he basic maxim of the approach I propose is 
this: The lawyer should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the 
particular case, seem most likely to promote justice."). 
62. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 12, at 66-67. 
63. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 13. 
64. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 3. 
65. See Wendel, Public Values, supra note 2. 
66. For more detailed analyses of the justice-centered theory, see generally LAWYERS' 
ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005); Carle, supra note 1; 
Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 389,393-94,441-58 (2005). 
67. Carle, supra note 1, at 117. 
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lyzed with a paramount focus on achieving justice,,,68 and that their fidelity 
be not to "their own moral principles, but ... to the moral principles inher-
ent in the law.,,69 
Attempting to harmonize theories of justice-centered and client-
centered ethicists,70 Susan Carle looks to the context of the parties' respec-
tive power. 71 She explains that "[i]n the context of representing powerful 
clients, lawyers' incentive is to do too much for their clients; in the context 
of clients lacking substantial resources, lawyers' incentive is to do too lit-
tle."n She suggests, therefore, that the relative power of the individuals or 
entities involved in a particular situation might justify contextual applica-
tion of ethical rules. 73 
I add to these my own call to context, but the context that I am talking 
about is the client's narrative. This might include, but is certainly not lim-
ited to, a consideration of what kind of case she has, what system she's up 
against, or her relative power. An exploration of this kind of context en-
tails a widening of the frame of the client's legal problem: an investigation 
into its history, a consideration of where the client is socially and culturally 
situated, and a "mapping [of] the web of relationships in which the problem 
arises." 74 
An inquiry into the client's narrative context would involve learning 
about her steady state, which Jerome Bruner and Anthony Amsterdam de-
scribe as a state "grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of things.,,75 That 
is, what did the client's day look like? What did it feel like? What charac-
ters, animate or inanimate, filled her day? What did she do and not do 
regularly? What was her life like before the trouble began? 
The trouble, of course, describes the reasons for the client's visit to the 
lawyer. 76 Something happened to disrupt her "legitimate ordinariness." 77 
What was it? Who was it? What happened? The trouble, then, involves 
much more than just the client's "legal" issue. To fully understand why the 
client has come to the lawyer, the lawyer must come to be familiar with the 
multiple layers of the client's steady state, and how and why it has been 
disrupted by the trouble she describes. 
68. Carle, supra note 1, at 116. 
69. Kruse, supra note 66, at 430. 
70. The scholars most typically identified as client-centered ethicists are Abbe Smith 
and Monroe Freedman. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2; Smith & Montross, 
supra note 2, at 517. 
71. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 1, at 119 (proposing that "[a ]ttention to client power" 
be used "as a factor in guiding lawyers' exercise of ethical discretion"). 
72. Id. at 119. 
73. Id. 
74. Piomelli, supra note 53, at 489 (emphasis removed). 
75. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 44, at 113. See also note 44 and accompany-
ing text. 
76. E.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 44, at 114. 
77. Id. at 113. 
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The lawyer must also inquire into and come to understand what efforts 
at redress the client has made or would like to make. 78 How can the trou-
ble be resolved? How does the client want it to be resolved? Does she 
want to return to the steady state, or does she seek some kind of transfor-
mation? Finally, does the client's story carry with it a message, a moral, a 
coda for the client, for the story's characters, for the lawyer, for the system 
in which the client's situation arises? 79 
This call to context builds on traditional client-centered theory, which 
demands that lawyers attend to their clients and work together with them to 
identify and achieve the goals of the representation. 80 It also expands on 
that theory by suggesting that lawyers, and the system that regulates them, 
should work to hear their clients' stories for what they are: unique and par-
ticular stories comprised of legal and non-legal elements that are fluid and 
evolving, not static or unchanging. 81 As Kate Kruse remarks, "[ c ]lients 
come to lawyers, not to get answers to routine legal questions, but to get 
help solving problems that are deeply embedded within particular con-
texts.,,82 
So the ethical regulatory scheme should reflect and respond to those 
particular contexts, or stories. Instead, the ethical regulatory scheme re-
flects and responds, at best, to abstract, general stories, and, at worst, to 
particular stories that bear little if any relation to the stories of clients like 
Laura and Sayra, or Ellie and Lillian. The rules that make up this regula-
tory scheme thus end up, at best, ignoring these clients, and, at worst, si-
lencing them. My call to context obligates lawyers to interpret the regula-
tory scheme consistent with their clients' descriptions of their legal and 
non-legal concerns, thus rendering the clients once again as characters in 
their own stories. 
An articulation of ethical principles that addresses specific problems is 
more likely to solve those problems in authentic, meaningful, and long-
lasting ways. Lawyers are more likely to follow such principles, and cli-
ents are more likely to receive satisfying legal assistance. 83 Because our 
system of ethical regulation must provide some measure of predictability, 
uniformity, and enforceability, the Rules of Professional Conduct them-
selves cannot be written to address with particularity the unique and spe-
78. E.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 44, at 114. 
79. !d. 
80. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED 
ApPROACH (2d ed. 2004); Dinerstein, supra note 48, at 585-86. 
81. See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 48, at 401-14 (describing the differences between tra-
ditional client-centered lawyering and critical lawyering theory); Piomelli, supra note 53, at 
511-12 (explaining that a lawyer's collaboration with clients regarding their stories can be a 
more effective strategy than where there is no collaboration); Shalleck, supra note 7, at 
1742. 
82. Kruse, supra note 48, at 374. 
83. See Goldfarb, supra note 50, at 1686-87 (describing a feminist clinical program 
that would seek to remake the attorney-client relationship) . 
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cific problems inherent in our clients' stories. But they can be read to do 
so. Thus, the system I propose gives the lawyer discretion to enter into 
meaningful dialogue with his client about her particular context. He can 
work with her to determine how her concerns fit in to the regulatory system 
and how the regulatory system can be interpreted to respond to her con-
cerns. 
This system, however, is only as good as the lawyer's use of his discre-
tion. Since the lawyer is himself an insider, the lawyer must exercise his 
discretion with intention and awareness, and not simply ratify the official 
stories we saw in the preceding section 84 by reflexively applying the black 
letter rules. If the lawyer is able to do this authentically - through critical 
reflection and collaboration with his client - the ethical problems I de-
scribed above might not even come up, let alone result in withdrawal or de-
clining cases. The lawyer and client together will be able to construct and 
tell a story that meets the needs of the client, the third parties, and the legal 
system. 85 
B. CRITICAL REFLECTION 
The first step in this process must be for the lawyer to be able to hear 
the clients' stories in a different way from the way that the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct suggest they should be heard. This is tricky. Without criti-
cal reflection, it is virtually impossible for the lawyer to know - to see, to 
hear, to understand - her clients. 86 Too often, lawyers unconsciously rely 
on their knowledge of and familiarity with the tools of their craft -
language and rituals of the law - and skip over the necessary step of at-
tempting to see and hear their client. The story they tell to the audience 
outside the relationship, therefore, is at best, a distorted version of the cli-
ent's story, and at worst the lawyer's own version of what she thinks the 
client's story is or should be. In neither case is the client herself able to 
speak or be heard. 
The challenge deepens for lawyers who seek to represent clients who 
are marginalized from mainstream American society. 87 Those clients are 
oppressed not only by the system in which they are trying to operate but 
84. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text regarding the official stories under-
lying Rules 4.2, 1.7, and 1.6. 
85. Gerald Lopez describes this process in areas other than resolving ethical conflicts. 
See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE 
LAW PRACTICE 43 (1992). 
86. See Grose, Constructing Clients' Stories, supra note 30, at 332. 
87. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the "Rect(fication of Names" 
in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19,26 (1996) (discussing how representation is 
already generally suspect, without taking into consideration matters of philosophical and 
political dimensions); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM 
AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) 
(discussing the representation of marginalized subjects in Western discourse and suggesting 
an alternative process for relating those subjects to that discourse). 
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also by their lawyer's inability to see and hear them as needed to portray 
them adequately within that system. More than just telling a wrong or in-
complete story about the client, the lawyer's attempts to pOliray the outside 
voice without critical reflection further marginalizes the client by keeping 
her voice outside the dominant legal discourse. 
To represent clients whose personal stories do not conform to the offi-
cial stories on which the ethical rules are based, lawyers must attend to 
their clients' different realities. The lawyer's goal, though, is not to arrive 
at some submerged, alternate reality, but rather to create the space for the 
client to speak by examining whatever is inhibiting the lawyer from hear-
ing. The most important element in representation is not portraying the 
"other" with verisimilitude (what really happened, what her story really is, 
finding out and telling the "truth"), but rather to engage in critical reflection 
to undertake a collaborative process with the client to construct a narrative 
that rings true to her experience and meets her goals. 88 
We all pass stories through our own pre-existing screen of "knowl-
edge" about how people act. Because the stories of those outside the 
hegemonic discourse often conflict with that pre-existing "knowledge," a 
tension arises between what the insiders "know" about the outsiders and 
what the outsiders' stories are describing. Confronted with this tension, in-
siders often choose not to question their own version of reality (what they 
"know" is "true"), but instead to recast the outsider's story into terms and 
language that make it consistent with the insiders' understanding of real-
ity.89 As we have seen, the problem of trying to hear the stories of particu-
lar clients is that our assumptions about people and how they act, who they 
are, and what they need, prevent us from being able to hear the actual per-
son standing before us. Moreover, our attempts to "translate" a person's 
story into language that we can hear further silence her because those very 
attempts take place against this backdrop of pre-understanding and assump-
tion. 
The answer to this problem is not to become paralyzed or complacent, 
but rather to be aware that it is a problem and to pay attention. It has long 
been understood that one of the ways to challenge hegemony and the re-
sulting oppression is "to make visible and vocal the underlying assump-
tions that produce and reproduce structures of domination. ,,90 In order to 
88. See Grose, Constructing Clients' Stories, supra note 30, at 332. 
89. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of 
Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1856 (1994) ("Faced with a conflict 
between deep-seated beliefs and a contradicting story, some people may adjust their beliefs, but 
others are likely to reject the story as untrue."). See also Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 
S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 263 (1994); Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 
GEO. L.J. 313, 322-23 (1992). 
90. TEACHJNG FOR DIVERSITY AND Scx::IAL JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 11. See also id at xvii (''Our 
goal in social justice education is to enable students to become conscious of their operating world view and 
to be able to examine critically alternative ways of understanding the world and social relations."). 
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do this, we need to be consciously and vigilantly aware of what we bring to 
our representation of clients. We need to engage in critical reflection in or-
der to uncover the assumptions through which we tend to pass all informa-
tion that comes our way, including how we define and categorize people 
seeking our legal assistance. 91 We need to attend to the unstated values 
that underlie legal norms and rules. We need to make explicit to ourselves 
how we have been socialized as lawyers and how that socialization affects 
how we see our clients. 92 
Through critical reflection, the lawyer self-consciously situates herself 
within the particular context in which she is operating. Specifically, she 
situates herself in relation to the legal system and its rules. She also situ-
ates herself in relation to the other characters involved both in the system in 
general and in the particular interaction of which she is a part. Those other 
characters could be the other people involved: the judge, the other lawyers, 
the witnesses, the government agency, the opposing party, or the client. 
But the other characters could also be the relevant rules, rituals, and prac-
tices of the particular system. 
Through critical reflection, the lawyer is able to identify her ability to 
operate among these characters as well as the limitations on that ability, no-
ticing what prevents her from moving freely among the various pieces of 
the system. She is also able to identify the ability of the other characters, 
91. See Grose, Constructing Clients' Stories, supra note 30, at 332. See also Jane H. 
Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 298 (2001) ("Critical reflection 
has at its root an attempt to tease out or hunt down assumptions."). 
92. Clinicians and other legal academics have written extensively on the challenges of 
teaching cross-cultural and/or client-centered lawyering so that students (who eventually 
become lawyers) are able to surmount this problem. See, e.g., Susan Bryant, The Five Hab-
its: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 33 (2001); Robert 
Dinerstein et aI., Legal Interviewing and Counseling: An Introduction, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 
281, 281-309 (2003); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, 
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability and Age in Lawyering Courses, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core 
Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 195, 207-08, 210-11 (2002); 
O'Leary, supra note 51, at 66; Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learn-
ing Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 
37,60-62 (1995); Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and 
Race, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219,237-42 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Coun-
seling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 373,378 (2002); Paulette 
J. Williams, The Divorce Case: Supervisory Teaching and Learning in Clinical Legal Edu-
cation, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 331, 371-73 (2002). See generally Elizabeth M. Igle-
sias, Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, International Labor Rights and the Evo-
lution of Latcrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575 (1999); Jacobs, supra 
note 17; Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book: The Latest Clinical Texts 
and a Sketch of a Future Agenda, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 131 (2006); Michael K. 
Power, Habermas and the Counterfactual Imagination, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1005 (1996); 
Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedeology and Social Justice Activism: 
Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003); Carwena Weng, 
Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural Sell-Awareness, 11 
CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005). 
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particularly the people, to move freely within the system, and the impedi-
ments on their ability to do so. By noticing these things, the lawyer can 
further identify the available choices about how to operate within the sys-
tem in which she is situated. She can then identify the impact those choices 
have on her position, on the position of the other characters in the system, 
and on the system itself. In this way, therefore, critical reflection is the 
means for the lawyer to identify the shifting nature of her position within 
the particular context in which she is situated, the shifting nature of all the 
other characters situated in that context, and the shifting nature of the con-
text itself. 93 
This process could be called strategic planning or knowledge of prece-
dent or even familiarity with the various personalities involved. On a 
deeper level, however, this kind of critical reflection provides an opportu-
nity to deconstruct what we know about facts, about law, about client iden-
tity, and about how all those elements interact with one another. In short, it 
allows us to be better advocates for our clients. 
In the context of the clients described here, critical reflection means the 
process of asking questions and looking for answers about what the client 
actually wants and cares about. Through that process, the lawyers might 
come to a better understanding of what brought their clients to them and, as 
a result, might be better able to resolve whatever ethical or other issues that 
could arise. Through time and deliberate effort - asking questions and 
really listening to the answers - the following stories are what the lawyers 
might put together within the first couple meetings with the clients. 
1. Sayra and Laura's Story Revisited 
The lawyer for Sayra might wonder why her client is so reluctant to 
talk. She might ask herself: Why has Sayra never had a lawyer before? 
What was going on that made the judge award custody to the father? Why 
did it take them so long to get divorced? How effective has Laura's repre-
sentation been? What does "severe autism" mean? What are Laura's "de-
velopmental delays"? What are the interests at stake here? Are those in-
terests really protected or threatened by the relevant ethical rule? 
The lawyer might also look carefully through the file, not merely to 
learn the legal status of the case, but also to piece together the story she 
does not know yet, the one the client has not told her, but the clues of 
which are in the file. 
Laura's father, Ishmael, married Sayra while they were both in high 
school, when they learned Sayra was pregnant. Laura was diagnosed with 
autism and developmental delay at age three. Sayra and Ishmael separated 
amicably when Laura was ten years old. Though Laura lived with Sayra, 
93. See Grose, Constructing Clients' Stories, supra note 30, at 329; Piomelli, supra 
note 53, at 488-89; Shalleck, supra note 7, at 1753. 
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Ishmael was an active and attentive father who spent a lot of time with 
Laura both at his house and at Sayra's. Though they had no formal custody 
or visitation schedule, Laura spent roughly half her time with each parent. 
Sayra has worked at an acupuncture and Traditional Chinese Medicine 
practice as a sort of messenger, cleaning person, and assistant ever since 
Laura, at the age of five, started going to school. Right from the start, one 
of the women's health practitioners, Carla (who is the lawyer's acupunctur-
ist), took an interest in Sayra and Laura, and she taught Sayra about herbal 
and homeopathic remedies that could be used to address some of Laura's 
developmental and behavioral issues. Sayra tried them with Laura and 
found them to work well. 
Shortly after she and Ishmael separated, Sayra began to realize that she 
had a problem with alcohol. She and Ishmael had been big drinkers in high 
school, and though she never went to parties anymore, she still drank her-
self to sleep most nights. Sayra worked with Carla for about a year and 
managed to give up drinking completely. She has been sober ever since. 
Six years later, Ishmael's boss confronted him about his drinking prob-
lem and warned him that he would be fired unless he cleaned himself up. 
Ishmael went into a twenty-eight-day rehab program, followed by a year of 
daily meetings with Alcoholics Anonymous. He is now down to one meet-
ing a week, unless he feels the need for more. He has been sober for two 
years. 
While in rehab, Ishmael became involved in a fathers' rights group and 
began to think he might want to have Laura live with him full-time. He 
also became involved with a new woman, who convinced him to hire a 
lawyer and go to court to get custody of Laura, who by then was sixteen 
years old. So six years after their initial separation, Ishmael filed a com-
plaint for divorce, seeking full legal and physical custody of Laura. 
Sayra was concerned, but not concerned enough to get a lawyer herself. 
She is a very private, shy person who does not like the idea of having a 
stranger involved in her personal life. Ishmael had felt the same way, 
which is why they had not sought a divorce from the beginning. They both 
had felt like they could work out their problems on their own. Sayra was 
therefore surprised when Ishmael showed up in court with a lawyer, and 
even more surprised when the judge appointed a lawyer for Laura. Laura's 
lawyer argued that because of Sayra's history of alcoholism and lack of a 
record of treatment and because of her involvement with alternative healing 
practices, some of which she had used on Laura, the young woman would 
be better cared for and happier in the stable environment her father could 
offer. The judge granted full custody to Ishmael with visitation to Sayra. 
That was two years ago. Sayra learned recently that Ishmael and his 
girlfriend were planning to get married and move into the girlfriend's 
house. The girlfriend has two cats and has told Ishmael that Laura's dogs, 
whom Laura has had since she was ten years old, cannot come to live with 
• 
Summer 2009] TELLING STORIES ABOUT ETHICS 187 
them. Sayra believes this would be traumatic for Laura. One of the main 
symptoms of autism is difficulty connecting with other people. It took 
Sayra and Ishmael years and extraordinary love and patience to get Laura 
to trust them enough to open up to them. They and Carla, who shares 
Laura's passion for animals, are the only people in the world to whom 
Laura connects. Otherwise, her primary emotional connections are to her 
two dogs and her guinea pig. 
With great reluctance and fear, Sayra decided she had to get the court 
involved. She talked to Carla, who recommended the lawyer to whom 
Sayra ended up going. The lawyer filed a complaint for modification of the 
custody decree based on the "changed circumstances" of the marriage and 
move. At the pre-trial hearing, where Ishmael once again had a lawyer, the 
judge appointed the same lawyer who had represented Laura in the initial 
custody case to represent her in the modification. Sayra knows that Laura 
does not feel safe with her lawyer and that they have never had a real con-
versation, because Laura will not even look directly at someone else, let 
alone talk to them, unless either Sayra or Ishmael is there with her. 
2. Lillian and Ellie's Story Revisited 
The lawyer for Lillian might explore whether there really is a conflict 
between her interests and Ellie's. What are their actual financial resources? 
What kind of relationship do they have, not just on paper, but in reality? 
What is Lillian's interest in having the lawyer draft the will for Ellie? 
What is Ellie's interest in the same? Are there other people who might 
need to be involved in these conversations? Are there other interests that 
might be at stake? What about the various children? He might also won-
der if there are reasons not to try to separate the two women, even for a 
brief period. Why has Lillian always wanted Ellie present for the meetings 
with the lawyer? 
This lawyer might also look carefully through his extensive files on 
Lillian, where he will probably discover quite a bit about Ellie as well, as 
their interests are and have been inextricably intertwined for so long. 
They were sisters. They took care of each other, shared their food 
stamps and their food, fought like cats and dogs, exchanged recipes, se-
crets, germs, tips on life and love. They watched as partners came and 
went, children grew up and moved on, other relatives grew old and died. 
They always walked to church together, took turns grocery shopping, 
traded rides to the post office and the bank, finished each other's sentences 
and kept track of each other's reading glasses. They were sisters. 
They had lived together for thirty years, ever since Lillian's husband 
went out one day to buy cigarettes and never came back. Luckily, Lillian 
and her husband had already managed to buy the tumbledown house where 
they had lived for the five years that they were married before he left. Be-
fore moving in with Lillian, Ellie had lived with her own husband, who 
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beat her up every time he got drunk, which was pretty much all the time. 
Lillian had tried for years to get Ellie to leave him and come live with her, 
but Ellie never felt comfortable imposing on her sister as long as Lillian's 
husband was around. Once he left, Ellie managed to get herself out of the 
mess she was in, and she and her two kids moved in with her sister. They 
had been together ever since. 
Years ago, Lillian thought about trying to get Ellie's name added to the 
deed, but her neighbor told her it would mess up Ellie's welfare benefits, 
and since that was income both sisters depended on to pay the mortgage, 
among other expenses, they decided just to leave it as it was. But the house 
is Ellie's home, whether or not she is on the deed. Since the welfare pay-
ments ended when Ellie's youngest child grew up and moved out ten years 
ago, the sisters now live on Lillian's disability benefits and whatever 
money they bring in from their craft business. 
Ellie is a scavenger. Every fall and spring, she scours yard sales, ga-
rage sales and estate sales and even a couple of dumps in high-class 
neighborhoods, gathering other folks' trash to turn into her own treasure. 
She converted part of the dining room into a crafts studio, and she and 
Lillian spend hours sorting through the stuff Ellie finds, adding a dab of 
paint here, a stitch of thread there, a valance of lace elsewhere. Every year 
from November I through December 24, they run a "Holiday Shop" out of 
their front room. Ellie does the customer service, also known as the hard-
sell end of the business, while Lillian runs the cash box. 
Over the past ten years, word of mouth has gained the Holiday Shop a 
certain amount of notoriety and lots of customers. They make enough 
profit in the two months to supplement their benefits income and cover 
their living expenses for the year. Plus, they are able to put some money 
into a savings account that they have been keeping ever since they started 
the business. The account is in Ellie's name, but she's not good with num-
bers, so Lillian keeps track of all the money. 
On particularly cold days in February, the sisters put their feet up in 
front of the space heater and go over the bank book together, fantasizing 
about that trip to Jamaica they've always wanted to take. Or, in the middle 
of August, when there is no breeze anywhere but right smack in front of the 
creaky old fan, they pull out the bank book and dream out loud about that 
cruise through Alaska to see those icebergs. 
C. COLLABORATION 
Notice how in these versions of the two stories, the ethical issues that 
seemed so prominent in the first "official" telling fade almost into nothing. 
In Sayra's case, the lawyer has a much better understanding of how Laura 
can and does (or does not) communicate and what meeting Laura might 
mean. In Ellie and Lillian's case, the lawyer might begin to have a differ-
ent understanding of who his client is and how the two sisters conceive of 
:L 
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themselves. We will see in this section how understanding their clients in 
this contextual way might empower the lawyers to preempt the ethical is-
sues altogether in these cases. 
By widening their frames of inquiry, simply by being curious and com-
passionate, these two lawyers are now much better situated to take the next 
step in representing their clients - figuring out how to construct a legal 
story that incorporates these narratives and can be heard by the decision-
makers in the legal system. 94 This next step, though, is not one for the law-
yer to take alone. 95 As Lucie White describes, the lawyer-client relation-
ship is not a "unidirectional 'professional service.' Rather, it is a 
collaborative communicative practice.,,96 This means, as we have seen, 
that the lawyer must attend to the client carefully and with an open mind to 
be able really to hear her story. It also means that the lawyer must partici-
pate actively in the relationship with the client. 97 
The lawyer is an expert in the rules that govern the particular legal system 
in which the representation is taking place, and she must bring that expertise to 
the relationship and add it to the mix of things that go into constructing the 
new story.98 The lawyer is also an expert in translating the legal system's as-
sumptions and expectations. Lawyers have relationships both to law and legal 
regulation and to clients and their narratives, and they have to negotiate both of 
those kinds of relationships. They have to understand the official stories as 
well as the clients' stories, and they have to bring that understanding to bear on 
the representation. That is the lawyer's role in the collaboration. 
94. This is not a rigid one-two process, but a more fluid back and forth between infor-
mation gathering and problem solving. I separate them out in this way to more easily ana-
lyze the two processes: learning the client's initial story and crafting her "legal" story. 
Binny Miller has written extensively about the construction of case theory, which is the in-
corporation of law, facts, and client goals into a story that can be used to drive a case or an 
organizing campaign. Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives, supra note 44; Miller, Teaching 
Case Theory, supra note 44. 
95. For some wonderful empirical analyses of the lawyer-client relationship in differ-
ent contexts, see generally Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: 
Towards a Radical Conception, 7 INT'L 1. Soc. L. 331 (1979); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contin-
gent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Is-
sues oj Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 795 (1998); 
Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies oj Motive 
in LattyerlClient Interaction, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 737 (1988); Susan P. Shapiro, Bush-
whacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice oj Law and Real L(fe, 
28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 87 (2003); Susan P. Shapiro, fr It Ain't Broke . .. An Empirical 
Perspective on Ethics 2000, Screening, and the Conflict-oj-Interest Rules, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1299 (2003). 
96. Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths 
from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 158 (1994). 
97. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 85, at 43-44; Alfieri, supra note 27; Piomelli, supra 
note 53, at 511-12; White, supra note 96, at 158. 
98. Ascanio Piomelli warns us not to avoid the law, but to put it in its place. At times, 
the law's tendencies to narrow the scope of disputes, parties, and issues, to focus simply on 
the facts established in a record, and to allocate decisions to a more or less disinterested out-
sider, are quite helpful. Piomelli, supra note 53, at 512. 
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But the collaboration also calls upon lawyers to be learners and sug-
gests they must view their clients as experts in their own deeply contextual 
lives. 99 Scholars like White, Lopez, and Piomelli challenge lawyers to rec-
ognize that "at the heart of collaboration is the notion that lawyers and cli-
ents will learn from each other and teach each other, and that they will 
work together to develop and carry out persuasive strategies." 1 00 
What would this new collaborative relationship look like in these con-
texts? Borrowing from the language of creative problem solving, these col-
laborations would ideally focus on the "underlying needs and interests," 
rather than on the "positions," of the individuals involved as well as of so-
ciety.lOI In order to engage in this kind of problem solving, the lawyer and 
client together must consider values and goals: their own, those of others 
involved in the problem, and those of the relevant legal rules. 102 In addi-
tion, the client and lawyer should inquire into the resources available to 
them outside the legal system and should work to anticipate and prevent 
future problems when crafting a solution to the current problem. 103 
99. Gerald Lopez reminds us that "subordinated people do deploy story/argument strate-
gies, some remarkably ingenious and resourceful, to contest the roles others would assign them." 
LOPEZ, supra note 85, at 49. 
100. Piomelli, supra note 53, at 448. 
101. Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 
CAL. W. L. REv. 375, 378 (1998). 
102. Id. See also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem Solving, 87 MARQ. L. 
REv. 697 (2004); Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Stuck in a Rut: The Role a/Creative Thinking 
in Problem Solving and Legal Education, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 835 (2003). 
103. See, e.g., Morton, supra note 101, at 378. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Law-
yer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 
72 TEMP. L. REv. 785 (1999). In that piece, Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes her vision of a 
lawyer as: 
[A] professional with formal legal training who employs law, as well as other 
relevant disciplines, to solve human problems and disputes ... and who facili-
tates and engages in processes designed to accomplish compliance with law and 
the pursuit of justice as members of society seek to accomplish legitimate aims of 
individual and social life. . .. Human disputes, problems, [etc.], while often hav-
ing legal implications, most often involve a host of other concerns: intrapsychic 
(emotional), interpersonal (social, including both familial and more instrumental-
ist relations, as in employment), economic, political, moral, and religious. 
Id., at 793-94. Menkel-Meadow exhorts lawyers to use: 
[C]ombinations of legal thinking with other kinds of thought processes and crea-
tivity. A simple inventory of needs, interests, claims, wants, and goals of all par-
ties will help develop the possibilities for solution searching for the creative law-
yer who looks for both common ground, as well as complementary and 
conflicting needs. 
Id. at 797. Similarly, Kimberly O'Leary breaks down the process of problem solving into 
four steps: step 1: Understand the client's problem; step 2: IdentifY actors affected by the legal 
problem; step 3: Research and understand diverse perspectives; step 4: Pose options, including a 
consensus-building option, to the client. O'Leary, supra note 51, at 81-86. See also Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 50, at 280-81 ("Collective grappling with ethical problems as they are hap-
pening has always seemed far more enriching .. " [I]t seems to me that before we finalize our 
rules we need to hear more conversations with ... others who have new, if complex, suggestions 
for how we should determine legal morality."). 
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D. (UN)REPRESENTED PARTIES? 
Sayra's goals seem to be twofold: to regain custody of Laura and to re-
solve her family tensions with as little adversity and outside involvement as 
possible. The lawyer could explore with the client how to present her story 
to an outside decisionmaker as fully as possible so that she is not portrayed 
as an irresponsible mother or manipulative ex-wife. Part of this process -
the construction of her story - might include meeting and getting to know 
Laura. 
The lawyer would learn from Sayra about the effects of Laura's dis-
ability and the importance of Laura's connections to Sayra, Ishmael, and 
Carla, the acupuncturist. Then she and Sayra together might determine that 
Laura was not getting meaningful representation from her own lawyer be-
cause of the lawyer's failure to understand that Laura's disability prevented 
Laura from being able to connect with her lawyer without help from some-
one Laura trusted. 
The lawyer might be able to offer her expertise about the policies be-
hind the rule against talking with represented parties, that is, to protect 
them from coercive lawyers, manipulation, and other undue influences. 
The lawyer and client would have a conversation in which they explored 
the potential impact on Laura of meeting her mother's lawyer. Finally, 
they would need to explore how to interact with Laura in a way that did not 
infringe on the rights of the other people involved, such as Laura and Ish-
mael. Could they meet Laura and not talk about the custody issue, that is, 
where Laura liked living? Could they have a meeting with Laura at which 
Carla, the acupuncturist, was present but not Laura's lawyer? Could they 
suggest to Ishmael's lawyer that Ishmael and Sayra meet with each other 
without any lawyer present? Could the lawyers mediate a discussion with 
Sayra and Ishmael and involve Ishmael's fiancee and Carla as well? 
All of these possibilities begin to address the multiple interests present 
in this case: protecting Laura from manipulation, preventing individuals 
from coercion, and resolving issues in ways that address the concerns and 
the needs of the various and connected characters, not just the two or three 
distinct "legal" actors. As such, they offer the promise of long-lasting, 
comprehensive, client-empowering solutions. 104 
104. A full examination of the potential benefits and certain complexity of bringing 
other professionals into the resolution of legal disputes is beyond the scope of this Article. 
See, e.g., Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision through Multidisciplinary Practice, 73 
U. COLO. L. REV. 787 (2002); Paula Galowitz, Collaboration between Lawyers and Social 
Workers: Re-examining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 
2123 (1999); Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdiscipli-
nary Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REv. 319 (1999). 
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E. 'CONFLICTS' OF INTEREST? 
As for Lillian's case, her goal seems to be to maintain financial and 
emotional stability in her life with Ellie. The conflict issue has clearly 
never occurred to either sister. Lillian does not see this as a question of 
two different cases or clients; she sees the lawyer's work to draft Ellie's 
will as part of his legal obligation to her, Lillian. 
The lawyer might offer his expertise on their rights to zealous advo-
cacy, which, as described earlier, would involve individual meetings and 
waivers. But the lawyer must be open to the possibility that neither sister 
really wants that. With his greater understanding of both Ellie's and 
Lillian's past relationships with men - Ellie's physical abuse and Lillian's 
abandonment - the sisters' insistence that they not be separated in the 
context of the representation might make more sense. For the purposes of 
this case, Lillian and Ellie think of themselves as one; they, as a unit, are 
The Client. 105 
By the same token, the lawyer's own understanding of his role as ad-
vocate might need to shift, challenging the assumption of the lawyer-client 
dyad and making room for the possibility that he actually could, consistent 
with his duty to provide zealous advocacy, represent both sisters at the 
same time. 106 Can the sisters work together with the lawyer, as one client, 
to fashion a relationship that protects all three of them, in light of how each 
individual self-identifies? 
Are there other characters they would like the lawyer to bring into this 
discussion? A minister or other significant person? Are there other people 
who might have an interest in their wills? Children? Neighbors? The two 
absent husbands? What about creditors? The lawyer's job, in this case, 
might be to round up all the interested "parties," legal and otherwise, so 
that whatever decisions he and the sisters end up making incorporate and 
address those multiple interests, both now and for the foreseeable future. 
This framework also provides the potential for long-lasting, comprehen-
sive, and satisfying solutions for both lawyer and client, clients, or client. 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE RULES ARE NOT 
(NECESSARIL Y) THE PROBLEM 
This Article is about two cases where neither the clients nor the law-
yers walked away happy, satisfied, or feeling that justice was served. In 
both cases, as in many others, the lawyer could not do - or did not think 
she could do - what the client wanted her to do, even though it was proba-
105. See Kruse, supra note 48, at 412. 
106. Thomas Shaffer has a famous discussion of a scenario in which a lawyer under-
takes to write a will for a husband and wife. He is one of the first ethics scholars who 
thought through the idea that lawyers often represent families and not individuals in them 
and that lawyers should be able to conceive of their work this way. See, e.g., SHAFFER & 
COCHRAN, supra note 3. 
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bly what would have been best for both the client and the system in which 
the client and the case were operating. In both cases, this was not because 
what the client wanted the lawyer to do was illegal or immoral or even 
ethically (with a small "e") questionable; these were not stories about body 
hiders or forgers or perjurers. The lawyer could not act in the best interests 
of her client because the lawyer understood herself to be hamstrung by the 
Rules of Ethics (with a big "E"). 
I began this exploration with a series of questions about our conflicting 
and competing loyalties and roles to the client, to ourselves, and to the sys-
tem of justice. I conclude it now by suggesting that we do not have to an-
swer those questions for every case and every client. We just have to see 
how in these two cases, the lawyer failed to be loyal to even one of those 
entities - from that we learn. Goldfarb describes how theories of ethical 
regulation evolve from experience with cases such as these, emerging as 
they do "from this network of relationships when we seek to resolve and 
explain our resolutions of the quotidian dilemmas that we encounter in the 
complex, nuanced, temporal context in which they arise." 107 
From these two cases, then, we can begin to construct a tentative theory 
about effective and ethical representation of clients. The theory has two 
elements. First, any system of ethical regulation must give the lawyer dis-
cretion to decide how the rules apply to any particular client's story. Sec-
ond, the lawyer must exercise that discretion critically and collaboratively 
with the client. In this way, the lawyer and client together can construct a 
new story that incorporates the needs and interests of multiple parties and 
perspectives, and seeks to address the present and future legal and non-
legal concerns of the particular client. 108 
I can hear at least some of the criticisms of this proposal even as I 
write: This system based on standards and not rules will result in anarchy. 
With all of these different measures floating around, how will regulators be 
able to regulate? We all know nice guys finish last; giving lawyers this 
kind of discretion means the bad guys will manipulate the rules and the 
good guys will lose out. Even the best-intentioned good guys might not 
have the skills or the time to engage in the kind of process described 
here. 109 
107. Goldfarb, supra note 50, at 1697-98. 
108. Paul Tremblay and others have written extensively on the legal profession's 
adoption of the medical model of case-by-case analysis, known as casuistry. See, e.g., Paul 
R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 
659 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1999); 
Paul R. Tremblay, The Role of Casuistry in Legal Ethics: A Tentative Inquiry, 1 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 493 (1994). See also Kruse, supra note 48, at 417-19; Wendel, Public Values, supra 
note 2, at 107-19. 
109. As Jenny Lyman has remarked in another context, "[learning more about real cli-
ents seriously complicates the practice of law." Jennifer P. Lyman, Getting Personal in Su-
pervision: Lookingfor That Fine Line, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 211, 228 (1995). 
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But let us take another look at what I am suggesting. I am not propos-
ing a major overhaul of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rather, I am 
using the ethical rules as a metaphor, a lens through which to examine the 
lawyer-client relationship. The Rules of Professional Conduct are not the 
problem, or, at least, they are not the whole problem. The problem is how 
we as lawyers are learning to interpret and apply and in fact interpreting 
and applying, the Rules, without enough attention to the individual client's 
goals, needs, or narrative context. 
Therefore, I propose we use different tools to interpret what the Rules 
of Professional Conduct mean. It is our job as lawyers to figure out how 
they apply to particular situations. We interpret rules by plugging them 
into stories about the world. If we are not critically reflective about it, the 
stories we use are those based on our own understanding of the world, our 
own stories. As I have tried to show through these two clients' situations, 
our own stories, and those on which the Rules are based, often fail to de-
scribe adequately our clients' legal and non-legal concerns. As a result, the 
solutions to which our stories lead us often fail to address carefully those 
concerns. 
Rather than interpreting the Rules based on our own stories, we need to 
try to interpret them based on stories we construct collaboratively with our 
clients. Sometimes those new stories might lead us to interpret the Rules 
just as we would have under our own stories. Part of the value of Rule 1.7, 
for example, is that it forces the lawyer to discuss particularly thorny issues 
with the client, and in some cases such a discussion might be all that is 
necessary to address and resolve any ethical concerns the lawyer might 
have. Part of the value of Rule 4.2 is that it requires lawyers to think hard 
about their motivations in interacting with the other parties. In some cases, 
such reflection may indeed prevent overreaching on the part of the lawyer. 
But in other cases, such as those described in this paper, the official stories 
underlying the Rules do not really address the concerns presented by the 
particular clients. In these cases, undertaking a collaboration with the cli-
ents to construct a new story, which would lead to a different interpretation 
of the Rules, might produce a more ethical and satisfying result. 
Yes, this system might be chaotic and difficult to regulate. Yes, some-
times bad guys will manipulate the rules to pull one over on the good guys. 
Sometimes the good guys themselves might make mistakes. 110 As we are 
all too well aware, however, our current system of regulation is chaotic and 
difficult to enforce,111 it is vulnerable to manipulation by the bad guys at 
the expense of the good guys,112 and the good guys themselves often do 
110. As Spivak notes, describing the importance of attending to the stories of outsid-
ers, "And you make mistakes. Big deal." THE SPIVAK READER, supra note 31, at 307. 
111. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 8. 
112. See, e.g., David Jay Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in MORAL 
LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 57-75 (Deb-
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make mistakes. l13 What my telling and retelling of the stories demon-
strates is that rather than increasing the number of sticky ethical situations, 
paying closer attention to client context and involving the client more in 
constructing her legal narrative actually resolves or even preempts con-
flicts. It is possible, therefore, that from those new narratives, the ones 
constructed collaboratively by the lawyer and the client, an ethical system 
will emerge that allows lawyers to be loyal to themselves, their clients, and 
the legal system, all at the same time. 
orah L. Rhode ed., 2006); Gordon, supra note 10. 
113. See, e.g., Top 10 Ethics Traps (And How to Avoid them), ABA 1., Nov. 2007, at 30. 
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